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Problem 12-05 (Algo)
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A
risk-neutral consumer is deciding whether to purchase a homogeneous product
from one of two firms. One firm produces an unreliable product and the other
a reliable product. At the time of the sale, the consumer is unable to distinguish
between the two firms’ products. From the consumer’s perspective, there is an
equal chance that a given firm’s product is reliable or unreliable. The
maximum amount this consumer will pay for an unreliable product is $0, while
she will pay $210 for a reliable product.
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a.
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Given
this uncertainty, what is the most this consumer will pay to purchase one
unit of this product?
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$
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b.
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How
much will this consumer be willing to pay for the product if the firm
offering the reliable product includes a warranty that will protect the
consumer?
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$
Problem 12-04
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You
are the manager of a firm that sells a “commodity” in a market that resembles
perfect competition, and your cost function is C(Q) = 2Q
+ 3Q2. Unfortunately, due to production lags, you must make
your output decision prior to knowing for certain the price that will prevail
in the market. You believe that there is a 70 percent chance the market price
will be $200 and a 30 percent chance it will be $600.
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a.
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Calculate
the expected market price.
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$
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b.
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What
output should you produce in order to maximize expected profits?
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units
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c.
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What are
your expected profits?
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$ It is not -1113 in expected profits. A and b are correct.
rev: 06_11_2013_Q
Problem 12-18 (Algo)
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Pelican
Point Financial Group’s clientele consists of two types of investors. The
first type of investor makes many transactions in a given year and has a net
worth of over $1 million. These investors seek unlimited access to investment
consultants and are willing to pay up to $30,000 annually for no-fee-based
transactions, or alternatively, $30 per trade. The other type of investor
also has a net worth of over $1 million but makes few transactions each year
and therefore is willing to pay $115 per trade.
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As
the manager of Pelican Point Financial Group, you are unable to determine
whether any given individual is a high- or low-volume transaction investor.
To deal with this issue, you design a self-selection mechanism that permits
you to identify each type of investor. You offer two types of plans for
customers with more than $1 million in assets: one plan has an annual
maintenance fee but offers a large number of “free” transactions
(call this the “Free Trade” Account); the other plan has no annual
maintenance fee but charges for each transaction (call this the “Free
Service” Account). Determine the specifics for each plan as listed
below:
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“Free Trade” Account:
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Number of
“free” transactions
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Price for each
transaction in excess of the number of “free” transactions
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$
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“Free Service”
Account:
rev: 06_11_2013_QC_31456
Problem 12-12
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As
the manager of Smith Construction, you need to make a decision on the number
of homes to build in a new residential area where you are the only builder.
Unfortunately, you must build the homes before you learn how strong demand is
for homes in this large neighborhood. There is a 60 percent chance of low
demand and a 40 percent chance of high demand. The corresponding (inverse)
demand functions for these two scenarios are P = 300,000 – 400Q
and P = 500,000 – 275Q, respectively. Your cost function is C(Q)
= 140,000 + 240,000Q.
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How many new homes should you build, and what profits can you expect?
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Number of homes you should build:
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homes
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Profits you can expect:
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$200 is
right, however, 13, 8600 is wrong for profits.
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